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The United States and the world are fast running out of time to
face up to the problems of increasing energy demand and dwindling
supplies of fossil fuels. Though many remain skeptical, there appears
to be an awakening of both the general public and world leaders to the
impending energy crisis. This public awareness has been heightened by
recent reports predicting shortages in the supply of oil as early as
the 1980' s and warning of the probable "social upheaval" which would
follow.
Unfortunately, although there finally is a growing realization
of the scope of the crisis, there is little consensus on when and how
to attack the problem. Until April 1977, official U. S. strategy
hinged heavily on the commercialization of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
Reactor (LMFBR) by the 1990' s. The LMFBR's were intended to phase out
the existing Light Water Reactors (LWR's) whose poor uranium utilization
would otherwise deplete uranium resources no later than sometime in the
next century.
When fuel can no longer sustain a chain reaction in LWR's at an
economic power level and is removed from the reactor, it still contains
fissile U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-241. Reprocessing of the spent fuel with
recycle of the fissile plutonium and uranium back to LWR's can provide
20% to 30% of the fissile requirements of a reload core . The recycle
of reprocessed fuel in the LMFBR on the other hand stretches uranium
resources approximately 5000%, by converting much more of the fertile
2
U-238 to plutonium .

U. S. Energy Policy
It was envisioned that commerical reprocessing of spent fuel with
recycle back to LWR's would begin in the 1980' s. The technological
experience and a portion of the reprocessed fuel would then be applied
to the first generation of LMFBR's in the 1990' s. The current energy
plan proposed by President Carter represents a vast departure from this
3long accepted approach . The overriding factor in the decision for this
departure has been given as the increased threat of nuclear weapons
proliferation, the argument being that large quantities of weapons
grade plutonium would be in commercial circulation. The new policy
indefinitely defers reprocessing of spent fuel and commercial intro-
duction of the LMFBR. Instead increased coal utilization, energy con-
servation, and the use of LWR's without recycle are emphasized. At the
same time the major research and development effort would be channeled
into alternate breeder reactors with lower proliferation potential and
into alternate energy sources, such as solar and geothermal.
Paper Scope
This paper concerns itself mainly with one segment of the new
energy plan— the loss of the plutonium and uranium recycle option in
LWR's. A comparison is made of the effects of continuing growth of
the LWR industry without recycle versus the same growth with uranium and
plutonium recycle. Naturally in either case some alternate nuclear or
non-nuclear energy source must still be developed, because in neither
case will uranium resources last through the end of the next century.
The comparison is made by determining the effects of the two alternatives
on uranium resources, electricity costs, the environment, and nuclear

weapon proliferation potential. Because proliferation is the overriding
factor given in the presidential decision to alter the nation's energy
plan, this subject is treated somewhat differently than the other sub-
jects, with attention also given to proliferation potentials of nuclear
systems other than the two LWR cases.
The question as to whether nuclear power, in any form, is needed in
order to meet energy needs is not addressed. There are those who argue
this point on the basis that increased utilization of coal and continued
use of other fossil fuels will prove adequate until new alternate sources
can be developed. The consensus of opinion however is that fossil fuels
cannot "go the distance" in the time required to develop such alternates.
Even the President's energy plan accepts this as reality. In spite of
its position that the nuclear share of power production should be kept as
low as possible, the plan projects 20% of the nation's electrical power
3being generated by LWR's by 1985 . Thus, the requirement for nuclear
augment of fossil fuels at increasing percentages until alternate sources
are developed is accepted as a basic premise.
Additionally, other than the following overview, no attempt will
be made to analyze the effects of delay or total abandonment of the LMFBR
program. Basically, the total abandonment of the LMFBR means only one
thing— a comparable alternate energy source, nuclear or otherwise, will
be developed in time to meet energy demands, or an ever increasing short-
fall of energy supply is inevitable in the next century. In perspective,
the recycle option in LWR's is a means to stretch resources, buy extra
time, possibly offer economic advantage, and provide a stepping stone
to LMFBR development. It is not an end but rather a means to an end of
the energy problem. Its most important contribution, without follow-up

of the LMFBR, would be in how much time it could buy. The LMFBR on the
other hand is an end, in that it can provide sufficient energy for
centuries to come. The two programs, LWR and LMFBR, cannot by analyzed
in total isolation from one another. A decision not to reprocess spent
fuel kills the LMFBR by default. A decision to reprocess for recycle
in LWR's strengthens the position of the LMFBR but would not necessarily
result in a reversal of the decision to defer or terminate the program.
It should also be mentioned that the recycle decision for LWR's
cannot be delayed as long as the one to commercialize the LMFBR. If
recycle in LWR's is to have any significant impact on uranium resources,
the decision for commercialization of reprocessing must begin almost
immediately. This would allow recycling to be in full swing in the
1980' s, continuing until uranium resources are exhausted or LWR's replaced
with an alternate energy source. On the other hand, providing research
and development is continued on the LMFBR, the commercialization decision
on the LMFBR could conceivably be delayed to the turn of the century.
Therefore, the LMFBR is considered in this paper only when required to
put LWR consequences in perspective or when the interdependence of the
two requires comment.
Finally, it should be noted that the physical differences and
technical problems associated with waste management of spent fuel under
the no-recycle option are not delineated in this paper. Though not
explicitly addressed, the ultimate effects of the differences in the two
waste management programs are included in the data on environmental and




The most obvious and direct effect of choosing not to reprocess
LWR spent fuel is the increase in the amount of uranium required over the
recycle option. As mentioned in the introduction, a uranium savings of
approximately 25% can be realized through recycle. The significant
question then becomes how important a savings of this magnitude is to
the overall energy picture. The answer ranges from insignificant to
essential depending on several factors, none of which can be adequately
forecast. The key to the answer lies in the ability to compare how
long uranium will be required as a fuel, and how long the existing
resources will last, with and without recycle.
Alternate Energy Sources
The determination of the time span over which uranium will be
required as a fuel does not lend itself to a quantitative analysis,
unfortunately leaving great room for controversy of opinion. It
essentially boils down to an educated guess as to when alternate energy
sources could come into full commercial operation. Such alternate
sources could be nuclear, such as reactors using the thorium fuel cycle
or fusion reactors, or they could involve combinations of solar, goe-
thermal, and other non-nuclear sources. Although not totally independent
of uranium resources, the LMFBR also should be considered as a possible
alternate, as well as any of a number of other breeder reactor concepts.
In fact, the LMFBR serves as a good reference with which to gauge an
earliest possible date by which any significant alternate energy source

could be commercially exploited.
Though research and development of the LMFBR began in the U. S.
before the 1950' s and until this year was the Energy Research and
Development Administration's (ERDA's) top priority project, continued
development at that high level of effort would probably barely enable
full commercialization by the turn of the century. Even so the LMFBR
has the advantage of being able to draw to some extent upon the technology
of the existing nuclear industry. Thus it appears likely that a
completely new alternate energy source, such as solar, cannot be
commercialized before sometime after the year 2000.
In the controversial report sponsored by the Ford Foundation,
Nuclear Issues and Choices, it is freely admitted that the analysis
presented depended upon the assumption that an "advanced technology,"
4
i.e., alternate energy source, would be available around 2020 . It is
felt that this is an optimistic but not impossible goal. If nothing
else, after an interruption of say ten years, it is conceivable that
the LMFBR could be resurrected and commercialized by around 2020,
particularly if other nations continue its development. Of course the
continued development by other nations negates the proliferation argument
against the LMFBR in the United States in the first place. At any
rate, with no hard data on which to base what at best is a highly sub-
jective prediction, it will be assumed that the year 2020 is a reasonable
estimate as to the time at which some advanced alternate energy source
could be developed. However, this appears to be an optimistic estimate,




The second problem of determining how long uranium resources will
last requires a prediction of both supply and demand. Each can be
analyzed quantitatively, but subjective decisions necessitated in
generating the data can lead to widely varying results.
In evaluating uranium supplies it is recognized that the costs of
recovery of various grades of ore deposits must be considered in
determining if the deposits will be economic to develop. For this reason
resource supply data are normally presented as quantities of uranium
in recovery cost increments, expressed in dollars per pound of U . The
3 8
costs usually used are operating and capital costs (in dollars of the
year during which the resource survey is made) not yet incurred at the
time the estimate is made. Since the costs have not been incurred at
the time of the estimate, they are referred to in the literature as
"forward costs." This terminology is not to be confused with estimates
which project present costs to future year dollars at an assumed
inflation rate.
Operating costs include labor, materials, transportation, power,
royalties, and taxes directly applicable to the operation. Capital
costs cover mine development and construction of mill and related
facilities required in production. These are costs, however, not prices.
Profit and costs already incurred, such as past expenditures for property
acquisition, exploration, and mine development, are not included. Thus
the various costs are independent of the market price, a higher value,
at which the estimated resources would be sold.
Adding to the confusion, data is also categorized as reserves and




probable, possible, and speculative. Reserves are the firmest
element of resources, comprising deposits that have been delineated by
drilling or other direct sampling methods . Probable, possible, and
speculative potential resources are estimates, in declining order of
reliability, of the quantity of uranium believed to be present in deposits
that are incompletely defined or undiscovered. These latter classes are
defined in ERDA's National Uranium Resource Evaluation (NURE) , Pre-
liminary Report of June 1976 as follows .
Probable potential resources are those estimated to occur in known
uranium districts. Possible potential resources are those estimated to
occur in undiscovered or partly defined deposits in formations or
geologic settings productive elsewhere within the same geologic province.
("Productive" as used here means that past production plus known reserves
exceed ten tons of U .) Finally, speculative potential resources are
3 8
those estimated to occur in undiscovered or partly defined deposits.
It should be noted that though an appropriate statistical basis for
establishing confidence limits for the potential estimates has not been
developed, research into possible application of statistical methodology
to NURE estimation procedures is underway. Though not a totally objective
process, the application of such methodology would go a long way toward
clarifying the resource picture and removing subjective judgements.
Table 2-1 shows the latest published ERDA estimates of uranium
reserves and potential resources in the categories discussed above, at
forward costs up to $30 and $50 per pound of U . The $50 category was
3 8
included in the ERDA report for the first time due to increased interest
in higher-cost resources. The "effective" tons of U , assuming the
3 8
recycle option, were determined by increasing the ERDA figures by 25%.

Table 2-1 6

















Reserves*** 820,000 1,025,000 980,000 1,225,000
Probable 1 ,090,000 1,362,500 1 ,370,000 1,712,500
Subtotal 1 ,910,000 2,387,500 2 ,350,000 2,937,500
Possible 1 ,120,000 1,400,000 1 ,420,000 1,775,000
Subtotal 3 ,030,000 3,787,500 3 ,770,000 4,712,500
Speculative 480,000 600,000 540,000 675,000
TOTAL 3,510,000 4,387,500 4,310,000 5,387,500
*Includes all lower cost reserves and resources
**0btained by multiplying figures in previous column by 1.25
***Includes estimated 140,000 tons U 3 8 available through the year 2000
as a byproduct of phosphate and copper production.
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The table vividly illustrates the cause of controversy on the subject
of U. S. uranium resources. Those who wish to paint a bleak picture are
quick to quote the figure of 680,000 tons of reserves, excluding phosphate
and copper production byproducts. The optimists, or those opposed to
recycle and the LMFBR, prefer to believe the much higher figure of
4,310,000 tons, including the speculative category. In comparing uranium
supply against demand, as is done in the latter part of this chapter,
subjectivity in this area can be postponed by comparing demand against
each category of supply. When drawing conclusions from these comparisons,
however, a judgement decision cannot be avoided.
If the truth were known, the quantities of uranium in all categories
of Table 2-1 probably exist in the U. S. Their existence however does
not insure their discovery in time to divert a supply shortage. Further,
once found no benefit is gained until mines can be developed and actually
producing uranium. This may seem too obvious and trivial an observation
to make, but it is explicitly pointed out because it is often ignored,
particularly by those who express great confidence in the ability of
the U. S. to meet its uranium needs. This area of concern is addressed
in ERDA's Survey of Uranium Industry Views Concerning U. S. Uranium
Resources and U. S. Uranium Production Activities . The report is a
summary of the survey of senior representatives of 16 uranium companies
which control 70% of the total U. S. reserves as reported by ERDA.
All companies felt that the U. S. uranium resource base was equal
to or greater than 1.8 million tons, with some feeling it would exceed
3.7 million tons. On the other hand, every company emphasized that the
near term problem was not the extent of the resource base, but the
ability to explore, mine, and mill the uranium at sufficient levels to
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satisfy demand. The major constraints on industry causing this attitude
were given as the problems of deeper mines and declining ore grades
,
more burdensome and every changing government regulations, market
uncertainties, and lack of trained miners. Several companies felt that
even with these constraints removed supply would fall short of demand
prior to 1985. Others felt demand could be met with constraints lifted,
but considered the likelihood of that happening very small.
As a final note on supply, all companies in the survey mentioned
above felt that the U. S. would be a net importer of uranium in the
1980' s. Uranium imports were not considered in this paper for three
reasons. First, meaningful predictions of imports are virtually
impossible to make. Secondly, political developments in the United
States and abroad could cut off uranium imports. Finally, considering
the number of developing countries with no independent uranium supply,
it seems the U. S. and other uranium rich countries must either turn
their backs on the developing third world energy needs or export
uranium to fulfill their requirements. Thus in ignoring uranium
imports and exports in this paper, domestic availability may have been
overestimated rather than underestimated. This is a point to be kept
in mind in comparing supply with demands, as follows.
Uranium Demand
As with supply, determination of uranium demand is dependent on
several factors, none of which are easily predicted. The major
variables involved are total future electrical energy demand, the
nuclear share of that total demand, the type of nulcear power plants
operated, the capacity factor of those plants, the percentage of U-235
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remaining in enrichment plant tails, and the fuel cycle option used,
i.e., recycle or no-recycle.
In making demand calculations in this paper it is assumed that
all nuclear plants will be LWR's and their average capacity factor will
be 65%. Rather than calculating a separate demand for the recycle
option, recycle is handled by its effect on supply—a 25% increase.
Future nuclear power plant capacity as well as enrichment tails assay
are both considered too uncertain to rely on a single predicted value,
and a sensitivity analysis is conducted instead. The reasons for these
uncertainties and the range of values considered are discussed below.
The projections of nuclear power plant capacity in the United
States have steadily declined over the past several years. For example,
in 1974 the Atomic Energy Commission's high and low projections of nuclear
power capacity in the year 2000 were 1,090,000 and 850,000 megawatts
g
electrical (MWe) . The ERDA forecast published in 1976 listed high,
mid, and low projections for the year 2000 as 620,400 MWe, 510,100 MWe,
9
and 380,500 MWe . Recent slowing of electrical consumption growth and
construction delays due to changing government regulations and court
battles are primary causes for lack of confidence in the higher fore-
casts of past years. With the above in mind, it is considered that
the low and mid 1976 ERDA projections are the most reasonable choices
to make in attempting to predict the most likely nuclear capacities
from 1977-2000. Both low and mid-case projections are listed in
Table 2-2. After the year 2000 it is assumed that installed nuclear
capacity will increase 10,000 MWe per year. This is in accordance with
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The percent of U-235 remaining in the tails of the enrichment
process has a significant effect on uranium consumption. The values used
in the sensitivity calculations are 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3%. The low value
of 0.1% is considered, because it is possible to obtain such separation
in centrifuge enrichment plants planned to be built in the United States.
It is also the planning figure quoted by Dr. Schlesinger . The 0.2%
figure is within the capability of existing gaseous diffusion plants,
although they are currently running around 0.25%. The high value of
0.3% could result if enrichment plant capacity becomes a problem before
that of a uranium ore shortage inasmuch that the higher the tails assay
the higher the throughput capacity of the plant. However, this would
be at the expense of increased U-235 in the depleted uranium residue.
Yearly future uranium demands were calculated, based on each assumed
tails assay, for both the ERDA low and mid forecasts of nuclear power
capacities in Table 2-2. Uranium exhaustion dates for each category of
supply, with and without recycle, were then determined by comparing the
cumulative yearly demands against the estimates of supply listed in
Table 2-2. The method of uranium demand calculations and exhaustion
date determinations is illustrated and discussed in detail in the
Appendix. The predicted dates of uranium exhaustion are presented in
Tables 2-3 and 2-4.
Uranium Exhaustion Dates
From Tables 2-3 and 2-4 it is seen that the earliest exhaustion
date is 1996 for $30 reserves, assuming the mid-ERDA capacity projection,
0.3% tails assay and the no-recycle option. The latest exhaustion date
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Exhaustion Dates of $50 Reserves and Potential Resources
0.1% Tails 0.2% Ta ils 0.3% Tails
Resource
Category No RecyciLe Recycle No Recycle Recycle No Recycle Recycle
Reserves 2002 2005 2000 2003 1998 2000
Probable 2017 2023 2014 2019 2010 2015
Possible 2030 2038 2026 2033 2021 2027
Speculative 2034 2043 2030 2037 2024 2031
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projection, 0.1% tails, and recycle. In looking solely at recycle
versus no-recycle, there is only a minor effect on the exhaustion date
of reserves, the difference ranging from 2 to A years for the various
cases considered. On the other hand, when considering total reserves
and potential resources, recycle can extend the exhaustion date as much
as 9 years.
Using Tables 2-3 and 2-4 one is free to choose the combination of
assumptions considered most likely to reflect actual operating conditions,
and thus the most likely dates that uranium supplies would be exhausted,
with and without recycle. In choosing a most likely case for this paper
the following rationale was used.
With nuclear power capacity projections being consistently revised
downward from year to year, the low-ERDA projection probably more closely
approximates the capacity which can be realized by 2000. Although
centrifuge and laser enrichment techniques may eventually allow tails
assays of 0.1% or less, the overall average will probably be closer to
0.2%. Keeping in mind that forward costs are significantly lower than
actual uranium market prices, it is thought that $30 forward-cost
resources are likely to be the maximum which would allow economically
feasible power plant operation.* Additionally, even if economically
feasible, lower grade ores will likely be more difficult to discover
and take longer to develop. Finally, though the existence of all
potential uranium resources defined by ERDA is highly probable, it is
considered unlikely that those beyond the probable category will be
discovered and developed before exhaustion of the more reliable categories,
*The average price per pound of U 3 e for 1977 deliveries under contract
as of July 1, 1977, was $17. 2011 .
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Therefore, considering $30 reserves and probable potential
resources, ERDA's low nuclear capacity projection, and 0.2% tails
assay, Table 2-3 shows the uranium exhaustion dates to be 2020 with
recycle and 2015 with no-recycle. If the assumption that an alternate
energy source cannot be developed before 2020 is correct and if the
assumptions made in developing the most likely exhaustion dates are
correct, then recycle is essential to maintain nuclear power capacity
during the 5 year gap.
Summary
Uncertainty in the significance of increased uranium utilization
by the recycle option cannot be completely removed. Unknowns in the
supply and demand of uranium, the development of alternate energy
sources, and the degree to which coal utilization can be expanded will
not be resolved for many years, but the recycle decision must be made
now. By the year 2000 the cumulative amount of residual fissile material
in spent fuel will represent an energy source equivalent to about 100
12
years of full flow operation of the Alaskan pipeline . To continue
to waste an existing natural resource of such magnitude while gambling
on unproven energy sources and undiscovered uranium resources does not
appear to be a prudent course of action. However, as pointed out in
the introduction, the effects of the recycle option are not confined
solely to uranium resources. Other effects which could affect the




In order to properly evaluate the relative merits of the recycle
and no-recycle options in LWR's, environmental effects need to be con-
sidered. Both radiological and non-radiological effects are involved.
However, the differences between the two fuel cycles in non-radiological
environmental effects are not considered significant enough to warrant
discussion here.
In comparing radiological effects, the largest advantage of the
recycle option is the reduction in uranium mining and milling operations
required to produce an equivalent amount of electrical energy as the
no-reycle option. This reduction in uranium requirements carries on
through the fuel cycle with reductions in capacities of UF conversion
6
plants, enrichment facilities, and UO fuel fabrication facilities. The
2
largest disadvantage of the recycle option is the addition of the re-
processing and mixed oxide fuel fabrication steps. Other factors
contributing to radiological differences between the two cycles include
differing radionuclide concentrations in the reactor itself and variations
in form and quantity of nuclear material transported and wastes stored.
One of the most comprehensive analyses of the environmental effects
of the recycle and no-recycle options is contained in the U. S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission report entitled Final Generic Environmental
Statement on the Use of Recycle Plutonium and Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light
13
Water Cooled Reactors (GESMO) . The development of mathematical models
to describe interrelating environmental consequences of the recycle and
no-recycle options is not within the scope of this paper. Instead the
basic approach used in GESMO will be briefly reviewed, and the major
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conclusions of the report presented and discussed.
Methodology of GESMO Study
In GESMO the cumulative radiological effects of the LWR industry
without recycle for the years 1975-2000 are determined, and this data is
then compared with the incremental effects attributed to the recycle
option. The capacity of the LWR industry for both fuel cycle options is
assumed to increase to 507,000 MWe by the year 2000. Environmental
effects for the recycle option are based on fuel reprocessing beginning
in 1978 and recycle in 1981. Quantities of radioactivity discharged
to the environment are calculated by defining "model" plants for each
phase of the fuel cycle for both options, determining the environmental
impact of each model plant, then multiplying the result by the number
of model plants required to support the assumed LWR capacity. Population
dose calculations are then made following the recommendations of the
International Commission on Radiological Protection. A detailed
description of the dose calculation methodology can be found in Chapter
IV, Section J, Appendix A of the GESMO report.
The consequences of accidents in every phase of both cycle options
are also analyzed in GESMO and found to be essentially the same whether
fissile materials are recycled in nuclear fuel or not. Additionally, the
anticipated low frequency of accidents that could have any significant
offsite effects during the 26 year report period dramatically reduces
the contribution to population doses from accidents. It was thus con-
sidered that the conservative estimates (overassessment of releases and
effects) used to account for normal releases from the model fuel cycle
plants had sufficient margin to encompass, over the period of the study,
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the impacts of possible accidental releases.
Results of GESMO Study
GESMO contains evaluations of five alternative fuel cycles and
numerous sensitivity analyses. However, only the results of interest
here have been extracted and presented in Table 3-1, Examination of the
table reveals that additional occupational exposure from the added fuel
reprocessing and mixed oxide fabrication steps in the recycle option are
more than nullified by the reduction in exposure resulting from reduced
uranium mining and milling operations. The non-occupational exposure
to the general population, although greater for the recycle option, is
held to a very modest increase over the no-recycle option, again largely
due to the reduced uranium requirements. The significance of the
differences in population dose commitments of the two cycles, or the
absolute effect of either cycle, is better illustrated by comparing the
dose commitments listed in Table 3-1 against the natural background
dose commitment of approximately 650 million person-rem to the U. S.
13population over the period 1975-2000 . The highest dose, 4.2463
million person-rem (3.91 + 0.3364) for non-occupational exposure with
recycle, is less than 1% of the natural background dose to the same
population.
To further illustrate the relative health effects of the two fuel
cycles, the estimated number of cancer deaths and genetic damage which
can be attributed to each option are summarized in Table 3-2. Again
the absolute numbers are best put in perspective by comparing them
with the estimated effects of natural background radiation. The
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is 90,000 ± 9,000 . Thus, the estimated error in the projected number
of cancers from natural background radiation, ± 9,000, is much larger
than the estimated health effects from either fuel cycle option.
Summary
The finding of the GESMO report was that "Differences in health
effects attributable to recycle provide no significant basis for




The recycle of plutonium and uranium in LWR's would result in an
economic impact on nuclear energy production. However, how much of
an impact and whether it would be favorable or unfavorable is not obvious
An economic analysis of the impact must take into consideration the
effects of recycle on uranium pricing and demand, as well as the esti-
mated costs of currently undeveloped reprocessing and waste disposal
industries. The fact that safety and security regulations governing
construction and operation of such facilities have not been promulgated
makes cost projection unusually difficult and subject to error.
A comprehensive economic analysis of the recycle and no-recycle
options is not presented here, as it is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, a summary of the economic analysis contained in Chapter XI of
GESMO will be made, followed by a comparison of the GESMO conclusions
with other published analyses. The costs associated with new safe-
guards designed to prevent theft of fissile material have not been
factored into these analyses. Current regulatory trends indicate that
additional safeguards will be required at all nuclear facilities.
Reprocessing plants, required in the recycle option, will undoubtedly
be affected the most.
GESMO Analysis
The primary economic parameters addressed in GESMO are the growth
rate of nuclear power; the price of uranium and its enrichment, mixed
oxide fabrication, reprocessing, and spent fuel disposal; the discount
rate; the date recycle begins; and the form of interim fuel storage.
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Using the most likely values of the various parameters as a base case,
the cumulated total cost of the recycle option through the year 2000 was
found to be $18 billion less than the no-recycle option, indicating
an economic incentive to choose recycle over the no-recycle option.
The present worth of this economic advantage or incentive in 1975
dollars, discounted at 10%, is $3.2 billion.
Sensitivity analyses conducted in GESMO revealed that the variables
causing the greatest economic impact were the uranium price and the
discount rate. Reducing the uranium price by half (from $28 to $14
per pound of U ) could reduce the recycle incentive by approximately
3 8
$2 billion, discounted at 10%, whereas doubling of uranium prices could
increase the economic advantage of recycle by $5 billion. When the
discount rate is reduced from 10% to 6%, the incentive to recycle
increases from $3 to $6 billion. The ranges of unit costs used in the
GESMO sensitivity analysis are provided for reference in Table 4-1.
Details of the rationale behind the choice of each unit cost as well
as the quantities of materials assumed processed can be found in
Chapter XI of GESMO.
A summary of the uncertainties encountered in determining specific
economic parameters for the analysis is shown in Table 4-2 along with
the sensitivity of the economic analysis to these uncertainties. The
data in the table indicate that if all the uncertainties adversely turn
to the maximum extent against recycle, the no-recycle option would
attain an economic present worth advantage of $2.4 billion, on the
other hand, if the uncertainties all turn favorable to the recycle
option, its economic advantage climbs to $11.4 billion. It is also
noted that for the ranges of uncertainties given in the table, no single
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parameter alone can cause the economic advantage to shift from the recycle
option.
GESMO goes one step further in comparing the economics of the two
cycles by attempting to quantify the dollar worth of the decrease of
radiological impact attributable to the no-recycle option. The dollar
value assigned to this social benefit is $1000/person-rem of whole body
population dose. This is considered a conservative (high) value and is
the upper value for a person-rem suggested in Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix I. Multiplying the reduction in
non-occupational exposure, 0.97 million person-rem*, by $1000/person-
rem results in a social benefit of $970 million. Since there is no
appropriate mechanism for discounting this benefit to a present worth,
it can only be compared to the total undiscounted increase in economic
costs of no-recycle over recycle, i.e., $18 billion. Assuming the
$1000 per person-rem is a reasonable figure, the social benefit of
foregoing the recycle option is thus outweighed by its economic benefit.
Other Economic Analyses
The Ford Foundation study discussed in Chapter 2 does not include
an independent economic analysis. However, it does devote several pages
to a critique of the GESMO analysis, calling it "the most comprehensive
analysis of the comparative economics of reprocessing and recycle."
Although it disagrees with some of the assumptions used in GESMO—the
use of 0.3% instead of 0.2% tails assay for example— the Ford Foundation
*This value exceeds that of 0.3363 million person-rem given in Table 3-1,
because Table 3-1 contains United States figures only. The 0.97 million
person-rem is total world population dose.
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group's most significant comment is on the lack of significance of the
$3.2 billion incentive. The position of the Foundation's study is
essentially contained in the two quotations which follow.
"The GESMO predicts a net discounted benefit of $3.2
billion (in 1975 dollars, discounted at 10 percent) over
the period 1976-2000, from uranium and plutonium recycle
when this option is compared with that of disposing of spent
fuel without recovery of uranium and plutonium. This
corresponds to a reduction by about 8 percent in the average
nuclear fuel cycle cost. This is much smaller than the
uncertainties in the cost estimates on which the analysis is
based. Moreover, since fuel costs are only about 15 percent
of bus bar electricity cost, and less than 10 percent of
consumer electricity price, the possible reduction in
electricity price would be less than 1 percent."
"It is clear from the preceding discussion that there are
numerous uncertainties in the economic comparison of the two
fuel cycle options considered. For some items, notably
uranium price, the GESMO analysis may have underestimated
the benefit of recycle. For a larger number of factors,
however, it may have chosen values for costs which are
too optimistic. The net benefit of reprocessing and recycle
appears to be consistent with zero, but with large un-
certainties. However the uncertainties are resolved,
recycle would have little effect on the cost of power:
nuclear power costs in the United States would be at most
1 mill/kwh higher or lower with recycle."
Another comprehensive and independently developed economic
analysis of the alternate fuel cycles is contained in an ERDA study,
Benefit Analysis of Reprocessing and Recycling Light Water Reactor
14
Fuel . The study is based on an analysis period of 1976-2000, and the
results are presented in terms of 1977 dollars. Using a discount
rate of 10%, the analysis indicates a base case incentive to recycle
of $2 billion (1977 dollars) compared with GESMO' s $3.2 billion (1975
dollars). As in GESMO, sensitivity analysis revealed that economic
incentive could shift to no-recycle if all uncertainties turn adverse
to the maximum extent against recycle. Returning any one economic
variable to its base case value, however, resulted in essentially a
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breakeven situation for the two fuel cycle modes.
Summary
In considering economic effects, recycle would more likely result
in lower power costs, but the advantage appears too small and uncertain




In considering the effects of the recycle versus no-recycle options
on nuclear weapons proliferation, there is little argument against the
contention that the reprocessing step can result in the separation of
plutonium in a form suitable for direct use in construction of a crude
nuclear weapon. Also, it is true that nuclear material directly useable
in the fabrication of a nuclear weapon does not exist in the LWR fuel
cycle if spent fuel is not reprocessed. However, at issue is whether
a decision by the United States to forego the recycle option results
in a significant impact, either beneficially or detrimentally, on
efforts to limit worldwide proliferation.
To make a rational determination of the proliferation impact of
the recycle decision in LWR's and the significance of the impact,
several questions are important. These are: what is the magnitude
of the additional effort required to separate plutonium from spent fuel
when reprocessing is not an integral step in the fuel cycle; what are
the relative merits of alternate routes to a nuclear weapons capability
outside of the commercial power fuel cycle; what are the relative pro-
liferation potentials of alternate nuclear power systems; and, what are
the political implications of the recycle decision? Before addressing
these questions a brief discussion of the various categories of pro-
liferation is appropriate.
Categories of Proliferation
Nuclear proliferation can be broken down into the two broad
categories of national and sub-national proliferation, the latter being
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associated with acts of terrorism and nuclear blackmail. The fabrication
of a nuclear bonb by a sub-national group could present greater danger
to public welfare and security than the addition of one more nation to
the "nuclear weapons club." On the other hand, the successful diversion
of nuclear material and fabrication of even a crude nuclear weapon is
many orders of magnitude more difficult for the sub-national group than
a national government. The difficulties are so great in fact that
theft of an existing nuclear weapon might be the more credible route
of sub-national groups to a nuclear capability. Therefore, although
sub-national proliferation is not ruled out as impossible or unimportant,
only the more difficult task of preventing national prof ileration is
addressed here. Two other categories of proliferation which are con-
sidered irrelevant to the recycle question are the growth in numbers and
types of nuclear weapons by existing weapons states and the growth in
the number of governments with commercial nuclear power plants.
Thus the remaining category of proliferation to be considered here
is the growth in the number of governments with a nuclear weapons
capability. In this paper the definition of a government with weapons
capability is extended to include one which has all components of a
nuclear weapon on hand, ready for assembly when desired. Utilizing
this definition of proliferation, the four questions originally posed
as pertinent to the effect of the recycle decision on proliferation
are addressed in turn.
Plutonium Separation from Spent Fuel
It is often assumed that the added time and effort required to
chemically reprocess spent fuel to obtain plutonium for a bomb is
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sufficient to justify a decision to forego the recycle option. It is
felt that at the very least such time delay would allow detection of an
impending weapons capability in time for political pressure to in-
fluence a nation not to consummate its plans. According to a paper
by Starr and Zebroski prepared for the American Power Conference in
April 1977, the significance of the time and effort involved in
chemical separation of spent fuel has been overemphasized . It is
concluded in the paper that with suitable preparation, the total time
and effort required to produce 10 kilograms of plutonium can be as
little as a few days elapsed time and a few man-weeks of effort. This
is not too surprising when it is considered that such a separation
facility need not be a full-fledged commercial separation facility
nor subject to the stringent safety and safeguards criteria of a
commercial reprocessing plant. The credibility of the conclusion
is further strengthened by the following step by step explanation
of the process given in the paper.
"The chemical separation steps involved are technically very
simple and extensively published. A spent fuel element is
transferred to a pool of water where the end fittings are cut
off and the individual fuel rods extracted from the fuel bundle.
These can be clipped to make pieces of rod about one foot long
each. These pieces are transferred to a stainless steel pot.
The uranium dioxide in the rods—and its contained plutonium
—
are then dissolved in nitric acid. The uranium and plutonium
are extracted from the resulting solution by stirring with
kerosene solvent containing tributyl phosphate. The plutonium
is separated from the uranium by scrubbing the solvent solution
with a small volume of solution containing a mild reducing agent
which converts the plutonium into a form which is soluble in
water, but not in the organic solvent. The plutonium extract
is boiled down, precipitated and roasted to make plutonium
dioxide. .. .While there can be considerable differences in
overall recovery and sharpness of separation, there is vir-
tually no likelihood that such an effort would fail to
separate out most of the plutonium."

35
Starr and Zebroski point out that the additional effort required
for chemical separation of plutonium is a relatively minor obstacle;
perhaps requiring about 10% of the effort, skills and resources required
to actually fabricate a workable bomb. Thus, it appears unlikely that
a government's capability to produce nuclear weapons will be decided on
whether or not commercial reprocessing is an integral part of the fuel
cycle.
Alternate Routes to Weapons Capability
In considering the relative merits of alternate routes to a nuclear
weapons capability outside the commercial power fuel cycle, it is
interesting to note that none of the known nuclear weapons states have
used power reactors as a source of nuclear weapon materials. This
historical fact is probably attributable to the existence of at least
seven alternate routes to weapons material production in addition to
the power reactor route. Several of these routes offer advantages
over the power reactors in requiring less technology, time, and expense
and producing higher weapons grade materials. The seven alternates are
production reactors designed specifically for plutonium production,
research reactors, and five methods of isotope separation. The relative
merits of each alternative, as indicated by Starr and Zebroski, are
presented in Table 5-1. The table shows at least four routes to nuclear
weapons material likely to be more attractive than the power reactor.
However, one must consider the case of the country which will need
to develop nuclear power anyway to provide a secure future energy source.
Specifically one must consider the question of whether a commercial





Eight Routes to Nuclear Weapons Material Production
Support Support
Source Cost Technology Industry
Power Reactor
Natural U High Med Med
Enriched U High High Large
Research Reactor*
Natural U V. Low Low Minor
Enriched U Low Med Large
Production Reactor* Med Med Med
Isotope Separation
Diffusion Cascade High High Large
Centrifuge Cascade* Med Med Med
Aerodynamic Jet Cascade** High Med Large
Electromagnetic Separation** Med High Med
Accelerator* Med Med Med
*More attractive route to nuclear weapons material production than
a natural uranium fueled power reactor in terms of cost and
technology and industry support.
**More attractive route to nuclear weapons material production than
an enriched uranium fueled power reactor in terms of cost and
technology and industry support.
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production of nuclear weapons, requiring only minimal additional time
and expenditure to develop. Actually over 35 countries, in addition to
the U. S., USSR, UK, China, France, India, Israel and South Africa,
already have research reactors and probably the technology base required
to independently develop a weapons capability . Further, even if
diversion of nuclear material from existing power reactors would be
more economical than building additional dedicated facilities, safe-
guards of the commercial power plants make detection very likely, whereas
dedicated facilities could be built outside of the safeguards framework.
Finally it must not be overlooked that advanced isotope separation
techniques, such as laser separation, are likely to be available within
the next decade. Laser separation shows promise of economically pro-
ducing virtually pure U-235 in small capacity plants, an almost perfect
situation for covert production of weapons grade material. If the
promise of laser separation is fulfilled, its proliferation potential would
far outweight any influence of the recycle decision.
Other Reactor Systems
It was indicated earlier that an alternate energy source would most
likely be required in the U. S. around the year 2020. If this alternate
is nuclear, the relative proliferation potentials of proposed nuclear
alternates should be compared with the recycle and no- recycle LWR
options. Specifically it should be considered whether proliferation
potential ought to play a significant role in the current recycle




Of the numerous alternate reactor systems proposed for their reduced
proliferation potential, none have been touted more than those utilizing
the thorium fuel cycle. In this fuel cycle the fissile isotope U-233
is produced from the fertile thorium. The fresh fuel in this cycle can
be rendered unuseable directly for weapon production by denaturing the
U-233 with U-238. In addition, separated U-233 is difficult to handle
because of penetrating gamma radiation emitted by one of the decay
products of U-232, an unavoidable impurity in U-233.
On the other hand, the denaturing of U-233 with U-238 leads to
the eventual production of chemically separable plutonium. However
the plutonium content is lower than that produced in the U-235 fuel
cycle by a factor of 3 to 10 . Also, like the proposed fuel spiking*
for the U-235 fuel cycle, the penetrating gamma radiation in the thorium
cycle may present a serious problem for sub-national groups, but its
effectiveness as a deterrent to national proliferation is doubtful.
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) of the U. S. Congress
has rated the LWR and seven other nuclear power systems with respect to
proliferation resistance. Reactor systems considered included the
High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) , the Light Water Breeder Reactor
(LWBR), and the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) , all of which
utilize the thorium fuel cycle . The factors considered in rating the
different systems were the production rate and quality of fissile material;
ability to withstand international embargoes and sanctions; impact of
diversion of the fuel cycle; cost of the facilities; ease of conversion
of diverted material to weapons material; and opportunities for covert




diversion. Additionally the ratings were made for four distinct
categories of proliferation as follows.
1. Nations desiring a major weapons force
2. Nations satisfied with a small and not necessarily
sophisticated nuclear capability
3. Nations wishing the option of rapid development of nuclear
weapons in the future
4. Non-state adversaries limited to a few crude devices
Table 5-2, taken from the OTA report, shows the relative resistance
to each category of proliferation of the various reactor systems. In
the table, Proliferation Category 2 has been further subdivided to
demonstrate the effect of instituting safeguards against diversion of
nuclear materials. It is interesting to note that no single reactor
system offers the greatest resistance to all categories of proliferation,
and the LWR generally ranks among the top five proliferation resistant
systems. Detailed descriptions of the reactor systems and their ad-
vantages and disadvantages with respect to proliferation can be found
in References 16 and 17.
As different reactor systems are evaluated it becomes increasingly
obvious that none are "proliferation proof." Some systems offer
greater deterrence to proliferation than others, but none stand out as
being vastly superior. However, it must be conceded that until very
recently proliferation potential was not of primary concern in reactor
design. ERDA recently began studying advanced reactor concepts with
first priority placed on proliferation considerations. Those being
considered include a gas core reactor, a suspended particle bed reactor,
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proliferation free reactor system will be developed, but it is doubtful
that such development will occur before an alternate energy source is
required.
Political Implications
There is no technological fix that can fully eliminate the problem
of potential proliferation. Concepts under development, if successful,
could make diversion of nuclear material from commercial power reactors
extremely difficult, but there remain several routes to a weapons capability
independent of commercial power reactors. With the inability of technology
alone to solve the problem, the decision of governments to either develop
or forego a nuclear weapons capability will be made almost exclusively
on the basis of political considerations.
It is apparently just such political considerations which prompted
the President's decision against reprocessing and the LMFBR. The
reasoning behind the position appears to be that the United States
cannot pressure other governments to forego the benefits of a technology
thought to have high proliferation risks unless it sets the exmaple by
foregoing the same benefits. However, reprocessing, recycling, and the
LMFBR do not have a significant proliferation impact. Therefore, the
political implications of this policy are likely to be counter productive,
or at best ineffectual, toward achieving the ultimate goal of containing
nuclear proliferation.
Non-nuclear countries would have to be naive not to recognize that
the moratorium on commercial reprocessing in the U. S. has no bearing
on the large reprocessing capability, under military control, for pro-
duction of nuclear weapons. In reality the "example" has not been set.
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In addition the self denial policy ignores the fact that most other
nations cannot as easily afford the luxury of foregoing the self-
sufficient energy supply provided by reprocessing and the LMFBR. Many
do not have significant fossil fuel resources and find themselves at
the mercy of the OPEC cartel. Further, and perhaps most importantly,
the United States must recognize it no longer holds a monopoly in the
nuclear power industry and cannot make effective unilateral decisions
without the support of the other nuclear exporting countries. The
influence of the U. S. on foreign nuclear markets has been erroding
over the past decade, and without the support of other nuclear suppliers,
the current policy can only accelerate that errosion. Countries which
were relying on the reprocessing services of the United States will
most likely turn to other suppliers or construct their own facilities
with reduced U. S. influence on safeguards and safety criteria.
Removal of any incentive or advantage in obtaining nuclear weapon
status is the real key to the proliferation problem. A country's
technical capability or indigenous commercial power facilities, in-
cluding reprocessing plants, are relatively unimportant. Virtually any
nation in the world which has decided to construct a nuclear weapon can
do so. Routes to weapons material production which are independent of
power reactors make neither LWR fuel cycle option effectual in reducing
the capability of such a nation to carry out its plans.
Ironically, the worst proliferation situation is envisioned only
if all countries agree to forego recycle. The false sense of security
and impression that the proliferation problem was largely solved by such
action could undermine the more effective deterrent measures of political
incentives, disincentives, and sanctions. Further, with the resulting
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concurrent worldwide demise of the LMFBR program, failure of countries
to develop alternate, self-sufficient energy sources could lead to
political and economic instabilities and need for greater military
strength—a situation ripe for nuclear proliferation.
Summary
It is considered an extremely remote possibility that the rest of
the world will follow the United States in renouncing reprocessing,
recycle, and the LMFBR. The reaction of several countries, including
France and West Germany, to President Carter's nuclear policy reinforces
this opinion. The end result is that the final U. S. decision on recycle




Until this year it was generally accepted in the nuclear industry
of this country and abroad that the United States was committed to
reprocessing LWR spent fuel to recover the unused uranium and plutonium
for recycle back to LWR's. In April 1977 President Carter announced
his intention to defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and
recycling of plutonium by the nuclear industry. An evaluation of the
consequences of this policy, as undertaken in this paper, requires the
comparison of the effects of the recycle and no-recycle options on
uranium resources, the environment, the cost of power production, and
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The recycle of uranium and plutonium effectively reduces uranium
consumption by approximately 25% over the no-recycle option. The
significance of the additional years of reactor operation made possible
by this increased efficiency of use of uranium resources will largely
depend on the date by which an alternate energy source can be developed
to replace the LWR.
The primary environmental impact of the two fuel cycle options is
in the radiation dose commitment to the United States population. The
difference in population dose commitments between the two options, as
well as the absolute value of either fuel cycle, can be shown to be
negligible in comparison with the population dose received from natural
background radiation.
The recycle option will probably result in lower electricity
costs. However, if all uncertainties in the economic parameters turn
adverse to recycle this would not be true. Although not negligible
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in its impact on power costs, the economic incentive to recycle is too
small and uncertain to be of itself a decisive factor in determining
recycle policy.
Any deterrence to proliferation resulting from the unavailability
of reprocessed plutonium in the no-recycle option is questionable in
light of the relative ease of plutonium separation from spent fuel elements
in small covert facilities. Furthermore, the commercial nuclear power
fuel cycle is not the most attractive route to a nuclear weapons
capability, neither in terms of time and effort to produce weapons grade
material nor in the expense and quality of the material produced. Most
countries either have or can obtain the facilities and technology to
attain nuclear weapons status if they desire to. Political incentives to
forego such status and disincentives to discourage it are the only
efforts effective in limiting proliferation. Decisions by the United
States on LWR fuel cycle options are not expected to help nor significantly
hinder such efforts.
The more efficient use of uranium resources by the recycle option is
the single most important consideration in determining which fuel cycle
the United States should select. Failure to recycle results in un-
avoidable loss of flexibility to respond to increasing energy demands
and dwindling fossil fuel supplies, not to mention the waste of a
natural resource. Uncertainties in the consumption and supply of
uranium, the time required to develop alternate energy sources, the
degree to which coal utilization can be expanded, and the future actions
of the OPEC cartel make it impossible to accurately predict the impact
of the lost flexibility. However, the consequences of a failure to
meet energy needs are potentially too catastrophic to gamble heavily on
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promising but unproven resources and technology. Therefore, the timely
reprocessing of spent fuel and the recycling of the recovered uranium





CALCULATION METHOD AND ASSUMPTIONS USED
IN DETERMINING URANIUM DEMAND
The calculation of uranium ore requirement was accomplished through
use of a factor, commonly known as the Duty Factor, which gives the
18
electrical kilowatt hours produced per ton of U . The Duty Factor,
3 8
assuming no process losses other than enrichment tails, can be shown to
be:
Duty Factor = <
18
>









18,510 is a conversion constant, in (hr/day) (KWe/MWe) (MTU/ton U )
3 8
Bu is fuel burnup, in MWD/MTU
E is plant electrical efficiency, in MWe/MWt
x is plant fuel enrichment, in percent
p
x is natural enrichment, 0.711%
n
x is enrichment of tails discharged from the enrichment plant,
in percent
The values of the above variables used in the calculations for
this paper were as follows:






x = 0.1%, 0.2%, and 0.3%
The value for burnup is based on a weighted average of 27,500
19




was made assuming 1/3 of all LWR's are BWR's and 2/3 PWR's .
The KWe-hrs of electrical energy produced by nuclear plants each
year was determined by multiplying the forecast nuclear capacities in
Table 2-2 by 1000 KWe/MWe, 8760 hours/yr, and the capacity factor of
0.65. Beyond the year 2000 a net addition of 10,000 MWe to the nuclear
capacxty each year was assumed
The yearly uranium ore consumption was then calculated by dividing
the energy produced by the appropriate Duty Factor. A sample cal-
culation of yearly uranium consumption in the year 2000 using ERDA's
low forecast of 380,500 MWe nuclear capacity and assuming 0.2% tails
assay is shown below.






= 34 x 10 6 KWe-hrs/ton U
3 8
Energy
Produced = (380,500 MWe) (1000 KWe/MWe) (8760 hrs/yr) (0.65)
= 2.166 x 10 12 KWe-hrs/yr
Ore
Consumed 2.166 x 10
12 KWe-hrs/yr
34 x 10 6 KWe-hrs/ton U
3 8




Yearly and cumulated uranium requirements, calculated in the above
manner, are shown in Tables A-l and A-2 for the period 1977 through 2000.
Because the yearly increase in nuclear capacity is assumed constant after
2000, the tables were truncated at that point. However the annual
additional requirement of U for years after 2000 is indicated for
3 8
each assumed tails assay.
In determining the exhaustion dates presented in Tables 2-3 and
2-4, the lists of cumulative uranium consumption of Tables A-l and A-2
were extended past 2000 until the year was reached in which total $50
uranium reserves and potential resources were exceeded by uranium con-
sumption. Exhaustion dates were then determined from the lists by
observing the years in which each category of uranium supply ($30 and
$50 reserves as well as probable, possible, and speculative potential
resources) were exceeded by consumption.
In determining exhaustion dates in the above manner, two simplifying
assumptions were inherently made. Initial core loadings, above and
beyond consumption during the first year of operation, were ignored,
as well as small uranium losses during fuel enrichment and fuel fabri-
cation. The error introduced by these assumptions is considered negli-
gible and several times smaller than the uncertainty in uranium supply
and nuclear capacity data. Additionally, by defining exhaustion date
as the last complete year in which demand could be met by supply, the
underestimation of uranium requirements due to the assumptions is
partially or perhaps overly compensated for by uranium available for
an additional partial year of operation.
Further, the exhaustion dates calculated assumed an expanding
nuclear power industry up until the physical exhaustion of uranium,

Table A-l
Uranium Consumption Based on ERDA's Low Forecast of
Nuclear Capacity
50
Thousands of Short Tons of U *
3 e
0.1% Tails 0.2% Tails 0.3% Tails
Year Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative
1977 7 7 8 8 10 10
1978 8 15 9 17 10 20
1979 8 23 9 26 11 32
1980 9 32 10 36 12 44
1981 10 42 12 48 14 58
1982 12 54 14 62 16 74
1983 14 67 16 77 19 93
1984 16 83 18 96 22 115
1985 18 101 21 117 26 140
1986 20 122 24 141 28 169
1987 22 144 26 167 31 200
1988 24 168 28 194 33 233
1989 26 195 30 225 36 269
1990 28 223 33 257 39 308
1991 31 253 35 293 42 351
1992 33 287 38 331 46 397
1993 35 322 41 372 49 446
1994 38 360 44 416 53 499
1995 41 401 47 463 57 555
1996 44 445 51 514 61 616
1997 47 492 54 568 65 681
1998 50 542 57 626 69 750
1999 53 594 61 686 73 823
2000 55 650 64 750 76 899
Additional Consumption Each Year After 2000
2000+ 1,451 tons 1,675 tons 2,008 tons
*0riginal calculations have been rounded to nearest 1000 tons. Thus addition
of any particular rounded yearly figure to the previous cumulative figures




Uranium Consumption Based on ERDA's Mid Forecast of
Nuclear Capacity
51
Thousands of Short Tons of U *
.
3 e































































































































Additional Consumption Each Year After 2000
1,451 tons 1,675 tons 2,008 tons
*0riginal calculations have been rounded to nearest 1000 tons. Thus addition
of any particular rounded yearly figure to the previous cumulative figures
will not in every case yield the current cumulative figure listed in the table,
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i.e., the nuclear plants going into operation during the year supply
is exhuasted would operate only one year. In reality this situation
would not be tolerated. Plants would not be built without an assured
uranium supply over their economic life. A point in time would be
reached when yearly plant construction would begin to decline to zero,
and each plant built would operate long enough to recover its capital
costs. There would be no sharp cutoff date in nuclear power production,




1. Hunter, Donald and Donald Avery, Plutonium Question: Recycle or
Store? Electrical World , Vol. 176, August 1, 1971.
2. Soar, Robert A., NRC Takes a Closer Look at Plutonium Recycling,
Physics Today, Vol. 28, August 1975.
3. The National Energy Plan, Executive Office of the President, Energy
Policy and Planning, April 29, 1977.
4. Keeny, Jr., Spurgeon M. , et. al., Nuclear Power Issues and Choices,
Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, sponsored by the
Ford Foundation and administered by the MITRE Corporation.
Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA 1977.
5. National Uranium Resource Evaluation, Preliminary Report, U. S.
Energy Research and Development Administration, Report No. GJO-111(76),
June 1976.
6. Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, U. S. Energy Research and
Development Administration, Report No. GJO—100(77), January 1, 1977.
7. Survey of United States Uranium Marketing Activity, U. S. Energy
Research and Development Administration, Report No. ERDA 77-46,
May 1977.
8. Nuclear Power Growth 1974-2000, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Report No. WASH-1139(74) , February 1974.
9. Forecast of Nuclear Capacity, Separative Work, Uranium, and Related
Quantities, U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration,
August 1976.
10. MacLachlan, Ann, Schlesinger Explains Carter's Policy on Breeder,
The Energy Daily
,
Vol. 5, No. Ill, June 8, 1977.
11. ERDA Survey Shows an Increase in the Average Price of Uranium for
1977, Atomic Energy Clearing House , Vol. 32, No. 41, October 10, 1977.
12. Boyer, Vincent S. , American Nuclear Society Statement on Plutonium
Recycle, American Nuclear Society, March 16, 1977.
13. Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycle Plutonium
in Mixed Oxide Fuels in Light Water Reactors, Report No. NUREG-3002,
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1976.
14. Benefit Analysis of Reprocessing and Recycling Light Water Reactor




15. Starr, C. and E. Zebroski, Nuclear Power and Weapons Proliferation,
American Power Conference, April 18-20, 1977.
16. Report to the LMFBR Steering Committee on Resources, Fuel & Fuel
Cycles & Proliferation Aspects, U. S. Energy Research and Development
Administration, Report No. ERDA 77-60, June 1977.
17. Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, Congress of the United States,
Office of Technology Assessment, June 30, 1977.
18. Witzig, Warren F. , Testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board in the Matter of Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Diablo Canyon,
Units 1 & 2), Dockets 50-275 and 50-323, December 14, 1976.
19. Wood, P. M. , Testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
in the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend, Units















^2^Thesis i. f ^
F659 Foster
A comparison of the
recycle and no- recycle
options in light water
reactors.

